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“Do as I Say, Not as I Do”—Towards a Pro-Active Exposure of 
Opposition Failings 
by James Spencer  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction  
This paper notes human commonalities and observes how and where Information Operations (IO) 
must be integrated within an over-arching Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or Counter-Terrorism 
campaign. It continues by examining open source accounts of popular dissatisfaction with 
Islamist organizations in the wider Middle East, and suggests how this sentiment and theme 
might be used to compliment, or even sometimes replace, more violent military and security 
operations. 
The Moral Law 
While it is fashionable—and politically advantageous—to invoke religious or cultural clashes of 
civilizations, the fundamental needs of all humanity—Arab or Jew, Muslim or Christian, man or 
woman—are similar; indeed the commonalities of the human condition form the basis of 
international law. These commonalities are effective IO opportunities in COIN operations. 
Everyone hates a hypocrite. Jesus taught his followers to pray to God to “Forgive us our 
trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us,” while the Qur’an says “Would you ask 
others to be righteous and forget to practice it yourselves?”[1] There is usually great glee when 
one who has been unforgiving of his fellow mortals’ trespasses is himself discovered to have feet 
of clay. 
Nowhere is more enthusiasm taken in exposing hypocrisy than in the public arena, where the 
political corpses of fallen Moral Crusaders litter the path of history—such as the recent cases of 
Mr. Spitzer, formerly a campaigning crime-buster who resigned as Governor of New York State 
over his alleged use of a prostitute, and of Pastor Ted Haggard who was forced to do likewise for 
similar reasons. In both tawdry cases, while the charges were legal, the real offence to the public 
was the hypocrisy:  
“[Governor Spitzer’s] short, arrogant statement simply was not enough, not from the 
Sheriff of Wall Street, not from the self-appointed Mr. Clean who went to Albany 
promising a new and better day.”[2]  
and similarly over Pastor Ted: 
“‘I had to expose the hypocrisy. He is in the position of influence of millions of followers, 
and he's preaching against gay marriage,’ Jones said. “But behind everybody's back 
doing what he's preached against.’”[3] 
On the geo-strategic level, moralizers such as ‘Usama bin Ladin and other Islamists—both from 
the exhortationary da’wi tradition, and from the violent jihadi current—have used Western failings, 
double standards, and hypocrisy to weaken the West’s wider Information Operations campaign—
broadly aimed at achieving liberal democracy—and undermine the effectiveness of the West’s 
counter-terrorist campaign. While Israel is the most frequently cited example of Western double 
standards, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i recently referred to U.S. torture: 
“The president of America officially and openly rejects the anti-torture bill. This is a very 
important issue. This means that torture must be legalized and that the Americans must 
be able to freely torture their prisoners and the innocent people who they detain in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and any part of the world. They are the flag bearers of supporting torture and 
yet they are talking about human rights.”[4] 
Unconsciously or not, this hypocrisy strikes to the core of one of Sir Robert Thompson’s Five 
Principles of Counter-Insurgency: “The Government must act in accordance with the law.”[5] 
These double standards can be used by both sides as the very effective basis for IO campaigns, 
linked to strong human and psychological aspects. 
Despite having been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Muslims around the globe, 
‘Usama bin Ladin has attained a Robin Hood status across the Islamic World, and is seen by 
many Muslims as attacking the Rich (West & Israel) and defending the Poor (Muslims). Most 
Western Information Operations (IO), such as the Lincoln Group’s campaign, have tried to 
“counter the negative use of information by our adversaries” in part by “plant[ing] those fake news 
articles trumpeting pro-U.S. stories”[6]—a zero-sum, rather than actively beneficial, practice. The 
Lincoln Group’s activities seem close to “grey” (non-attributed) psychological operations, which, 
once disclosed, evince mistrust in the general population, vide the recent discussion of foreign 
Arabic satellite channels on al-Arabiyyah: 
“It is said and believed by public opinion that big question marks appeared on stations 
that are financed by foreign countries even before they were launched and seen by the 
Arab viewers. Therefore, they have not had any credibility among the average Arabs. If 
their aim is to form a public opinion or change policies, they will be doomed to failure 
even before they start.”[7] 
It is far more effective in the long term to report the truth with attribution (“white” psychological-
operations), and let people draw their own conclusions. This is scarcely new: 
“Because Voice of America transmitted accurate news even when things were going 
badly for the Allies, the audience believed its reporting when the tide of the war turned. 
Telling the truth built credibility, the most vital commodity of international broadcasting.”[8] 
Hearts and Minds Campaigns 
It is worth discussing briefly two related phrases regularly recited but less often understood: 
“breaking the Enemy’s will to fight” and “winning the hearts and minds.” 
It is generally assumed that breaking the Enemy’s will to fight is achieved by focusing extreme 
violence on the individual at the tactical level, or by indiscriminate violence on the target 
population at the strategic level. Yet for individuals who do not fear death, it is no deterrent; while 
for those who do fear death, once such a threat is removed, they are likely to return to their 
previous behavior if the motivating cause has not been addressed. For civilian populations, 
despite the theories of Douhet and his ilk, experience from Internal Security to General War 
demonstrates that indiscriminate violence often exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem. 
However, as Sun Tzu wrote, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance 
without fighting”[9]—which is where hearts and minds campaigns come in, reconciling the prime 
political campaign with the subordinate military campaign aims. 
The term “Hearts and Minds” was coined by General Sir Gerald Templar, the architect of the 
Malayan Emergency strategy, who stated: “The answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more 
troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”[10] 
Figure 1: Standard Deviation in a Normal Distribution Curve, Annotated 
 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_distribution)  
According to the theory of Normal Distribution, shown at Figure 1, most of the population (80 
percent) do not support a minority Opposition; indeed less than 3 percent of the population 
actively support the Opposition. Identifying the 0.1 percent of the population which comprise the 
Activists is liable to be difficult; they are likely to be highly committed to their cause, and given the 
nature of their ‘activity’ it will be difficult to identify, isolate and remove them: 20-40 Activist 
terrorists with about 200 active supporters were able to operate in the Algiers Casbah despite the 
best efforts of the French 11 PARA Division. The Main Effort, therefore, must be to isolate the 
Activists from their support base. At this stage, once deserted—even betrayed—by their 
supporters, Activists may be targeted without becoming martyrs to inspire others. 
From COIN Principals, and their desired effect of dislocation, two observations fall out. First, 
following Phineas T Barnum’s dictum that “you cannot fool all of the people all of the time,” it will 
be impossible to get all of the people to actively support the Allied movement’s ideals. Secondly, 
since that is unfeasible, all that is attainable—and necessary—is to move the subject population 
(the Active Supporters of the Activists) one phase to the centre: into passive support, thus 
isolating the Activists. A major means of achieving this is by the negative campaigns so familiar in 
U.S. domestic politics: exposing corruption and manifesto hypocrisy. 
The Love of Money is the Root of All Evil[11] 
Citizens of the West live in a mostly secular era. Religious leaders may preach and exhort morally 
sound behavior, but threats to their followers’ immortal souls have less currency than in times 
gone by. Politicians are, with some exceptions, subject to a degree of political cynicism.[12] In the 
Middle East, most politicians are likewise looked down upon as self-serving and corrupt—unless 
one happens to belong to the politician’s sub-national grouping, in which case they are altruistic 
champions. The institutions of civil society—agents of ‘deep democracy’—which are widespread 
in the secular West, are either lacking or weak in the Middle East. In the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, for instance, HAMAS did not so much win the 2005 Elections, as FATAH lost them. 
This was not only a tactical failing, as FATAH fielded a plethora of candidates in most seats so 
dividing their vote, but also a moral one: HAMAS played on the corruption and cronyism for which 
FATAH is infamous. The West’s decision to continue to work through FATAH has not forced it to 
go through the root and branch reform customary after such a political decimation. As a result, 
FATAH’s reputation and mentality remains corrupt, while its failure to secure any meaningful 
results from its negotiations undermines the secular moderation which the West advocates: it is 
still not a credible alternative to HAMAS: 
“Hamas and Islamic Jihad proved that they are capable of responding to Israel while 
President Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have failed to remove a single 
Israeli military roadblock or to freeze the construction of a single settlement.”[13] 
While the opinion of, and contempt for, secular politicians is broadly the same as in the West, it is 
in the sphere of religion that matters are greatly different. Most inhabitants of the Middle East, of 
all creeds and ethnicities, are more traditional than their Western counterparts. Religious leaders 
wield significant influence over their followers. Often, this translates into religious leaders’ 
involvement in active politics: in Iran, this concept has been taken to the logical extreme as the 
velayet-e faghih or Rule of the Jurisprudent, while in Sa’udi Arabia, the basis of the government’s 
power has been the ‘holy alliance’ between the Sa’ud family (the temporal rulers of al-Dir’yah) 
and Al al-Shaykh—descendants of Muhammad ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of ‘Wahhabism’. 
Yet religious leaders are subject to the same “desires and failings” as their lay fellows. In the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, part of the reason behind the rise of the Reformists was Ayatollah Akbar 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s alleged “corruption [which] resulted in animosity and hatred by the people 
towards him and his cabinet, which was very clear in the landslide win by Khatami in 1997.”[14] 
The sins of the flesh are by no means restricted to Iran. In the recent Pakistani elections, the 
Awami National Party replaced the Islamists: while an Islamic party, the main element to their 
manifesto was a Pashtun nationalist one. For the Islamists who swept to power on a wave of anti-
American feeling, the ride soon faded on the rocky reality of politics: 
“they were not sincere in their efforts to infuse politics with the tenets of Islam, residents 
say. One perception is that they used politics to get rich. In 2002, ‘they used to go out 
canvassing on bicycles,’ says Ali Jan, pushing his shopping cart through the aisles of a 
Peshawar supermarket. ‘Now, they're driving around in Land Cruisers.’ ‘They are 
hypocrites,’ adds Gul Khan, pausing for tea on the other side of town. To him and others, 
Monday was a victory for Islam—driving corrupt mullahs from power in favor of a party 
that truly intends to help the people, it is hoped.”[15] 
For many years the International Community has donated vast funds to support the Palestinian 
people; the limited accountability allegedly saw members of FATAH embezzle funds for personal 
use at the expense of their Cause. However the West has proscribed all three wings of HAMAS 
because of its terrorist wing, the ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades. By refusing to recognize or deal 
officially with the political or social wings of HAMAS, the West has removed financial temptation 
from HAMAS members, and as a result they remain mostly unsullied by corruption. Not only is 
this an opportunity lost, but the West continues to deal with the reputedly corrupt ‘political’ wing of 
FATAH, whose terrorist wing—the proscribed al-‘Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades —carries out attacks on 
Israel. To most Arabs, the qualitative difference between the organizations seems to be 
ideological—secular versus Islamist—and not an issue of terrorism. The West thus appears 
hypocritical in its choice of partners—hardly the democracy it claims to support. 
Doctrinal Failures 
Given the importance which most religions ascribe to “the Word,” and in particular to scriptures, it 
would be expected that the Opposition’s doctrinal failures would seized upon by the West, yet this 
has rarely happened. Many of the doctrinal challenges to various Islamist issues come from 
within Islamism itself, such as al-Muqadisi’s criticism of his former student Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
or Dr Abdal Aziz al-Sharif attacking al-Qa’ida’s actions, occasioning a recent rebuttal by Dr 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. Moderate and secular Arabs have also questioned the Islamic principles of 
Islamists’ conduct in discussions of their actions and outrages. An al-Hayat correspondent, Jihad 
al-Khazin wrote: 
“How can a terrorist kill himself, or kill a Muslim, after reading: ‘Nor kill (or destroy) 
yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful’ and ‘If a man kills a Believer 
intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever)’?”[16] 
Similarly, an Egyptian televangelist called Mu’iz Masud 
“did what few Arab Muslim scholars do: he declared suicide bombings to be haram, 
scripturally forbidden. This was no ordinary feat, particularly during a week when the 
Palestinian death toll in Gaza was rising to more than 100 people.”[17] 
However, these debates concern jihadis—violent extremists. What of a political party –HAMAS—
which stood on a da’wi Islamic manifesto, but fails to fulfill Qura’nic[18] requirements to protect 
religious minorities in their midst? 
“Gaza, which is controlled by the Islamist group Hamas, is home to 3,500 Christians, 
mostly Greek Orthodox. A number of Christian and other institutions regarded by Muslim 
extremists as un-Islamic have been targeted by armed gangs over the past two years in 
the coastal territory, the BBC's Katya Adler in Jerusalem says.”[19] 
Yet the eyes of the world are concentrated on the reciprocal exchanges of tactical missiles and 
air-strikes, rather than the strategic issue of challenging the hypocritical religious bigotry. 
In 2005 elections took place in Iraq and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Both nations saw 
two of the most transparent, free and fair elections to have taken place in the Middle East. In the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, HAMAS won the ballot, while in Iraq voting resulted in the 
election, and subsequent re-election, of Shi’a Islamist majority governments. Yet so abusive has 
been the rule of the clerics’ and their men-at-arms over the last few years that young Shi’a Iraqis 
are turning away: 
“‘I hate Islam and all the clerics because they limit our freedom every day and their 
instruction became heavy over us,’ said Sara, a high school student in Basra. ‘Most of the 
girls in my high school hate that Islamic people control the authority because they don’t 
deserve to be rulers.’ 
Atheer, a 19-year-old from a poor, heavily Shiite neighborhood in southern Baghdad, said: 
‘The religion men are liars. Young people don’t believe them. Guys my age are not 
interested in religion anymore.’”[20] 
Sunnis Arabs of all ages have likewise rejected the efforts of the Transnational Jihadis to drag 
Iraq back into the 7th Century. Much of this has to do with a potential Islamist government 
threatening entrenched tribal authority and revenue sources, but no little was the Islamists’ 
intolerant attitude towards others:  
“they found themselves stranded in neighborhoods that were governed by seventh-
century rules. During an interview with a dozen Sunni teenage boys in a Baghdad 
detention facility on several sticky days in September, several of them expressed relief at 
being in jail, so they could wear shorts, a form of dress they would have been punished 
for in their neighborhoods.”[21] 
Both Iraq and the Occupied Territories are exceptionally complicated for the Islamists—both 
occupied nations, with educated, previously secular populations, and demographically significant 
quantities of non-Muslims. Yet in both locations they have been freely elected, and have had the 
ability to enforce their beliefs with lethal force—yet are being rejected. Western IO must analyze 
and harness this rejection, and spread it—truthfully—elsewhere in the region. 
Getting the Message Out  
It is tempting to try to undermine Islamist rule by sanctions etc, however this merely provides the 
Islamists with an excuse for their failings—and when Islamists are able to practice ‘original Islam’ 
without interference, all will be an earthly paradise. Such meddling just delays the moment when 
Islamists must confront their reality that Islam is a way of life sent by “God, the Sustainer of the 
Worlds, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious”[22]—and as such is infinitely capable of 
evolving over the centuries to meet the needs of Muslims. The Islamic Reformation and 
Enlightenment must come from within Islam itself; external interference delays it. 
The West’s ability to exhort better behavior in the Middle East has been undermined by politically 
expedient actions, easily portrayed as such, which run counter to our liberal democratic culture. 
This has been exploited gleefully by Islamists as hypocrisy, and hostility to Islam. While 
exhortation should not be abandoned as a soft-power approach, until the West practices what it 
preaches, it is unlikely to gain much traction—indeed it continues to open up new avenues of IO 
exploitation for Islamists. 
Having a reduced ability to exhort positive behavior, what remains is an option of drawing wider 
attention to the failings of Islamist etc governments– or as Abu Sa'id al-Khudri narrated 
“The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: The best fighting (jihad) in the path of Allah is (to 
speak) a word of justice to an oppressive ruler.”[23]  
Ms Tavernise’s excellent article “Violence Leaves Young Iraqis Doubting Clerics”[24] for the New 
York Times was unusual in that it offered “a version . . . in Arabic,” which represents a start, yet 
this requires bilingual literacy, access to the internet, even above the self-selection of someone 
who takes a liberal American newspaper. The chances of such an article reaching the key 
readership on its own are slim. It may, however, be possible for translations of relevant articles 
actively to be offered up for syndication in Middle Eastern newspapers and websites at a heavily 
subsidized rate. The problem with such a programmed is that were it federally funded, the 
temptation for politicians with short term electoral horizons would be to influence the translation, 
or to have propaganda stories inserted in the information flow, thus contaminating the virtue of 
the programmed—and virtue is a binary issue. Commercial media outlets have both editorial and 
readership imperatives, and are thus also unsuitable. One of the few non-partisan organizations, 
like Soros’ Open Society Institute, or the UN’s IRIN news, might be prepared to take up the 
challenge, so long as editorial independence was assured. 
 
Despite concerns over the freedom of the Press in most of the Middle East, there is a real thirst 
for information. Much of the world is watching with approval—and envy—the public display of 
electoral democracy in the United States: 
“‘The U.S. election appears to be generating more enthusiasm [than the Iranian elections]. 
Iranian newspapers are full of articles about Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and John 
McCain. An Iranian academic said he preferred McCain because Republicans—George 
W. Bush excluded—have historically been interested in closer ties with Iran.’”[25] 
The issue then, is less ‘getting the news out’, and more getting market share. But the high-level 
U.S. response has been to fund state sponsored TV channel al-Hurra (“The Free One”) and 
Radio Sawa (“Together”): 
“Yet, according to a recent Zogby poll, only 1% of Arab viewers watch it as their first 
choice. Al Hurra claims 21.3 million viewers, but it will not publish the Nielsen survey that 
supposedly supports this figure. The station is rightly regarded by most Arabs as a 
mouthpiece for the Bush administration.”[26] 
In many ways, the very public spat between the Blair administration and the BBC over the so-
called Dodgy Dossier[27] has increased the BBC’s reputation for impartiality and editorial 
independence. VOA, RFE, Sawa, al-Hurra have far to go before they inspire such confidence; 
and without confidence, they are likely to lack an audience. 
Lower-level efforts in Afghanistan et al.[28] have been less "on message" but more successful, 
although in the absence of local competition. Given that most people subscribe to media outlets 
which accord to their political beliefs, they are unlikely to change to one that does not. The best 
solution, therefore, is not to compete fruitlessly, but to go to the market leaders: al-Jazeera or al-
Arabiyya, which already host lively discussions about politics, religion, social issues etc, and 
regularly discuss al-Qa’ida videos, the Abu Ghuraib scandal etc. 
There is another advantage in being a guest commentator on an extant TV station—one can 
debate without having to maintain a constant news flow. As the Israelis discovered during their 
2006 attack against Lebanon, Hizballah’s use of their satellite station al-Manar enabled them to 
set the agenda of discussion. Not having to confirm all details before releasing them allowed 
Hizballah to pre-empt IDF statements, and establish the ‘truth’ of an event long before it could be 
confirmed. They thus got inside the IDF IO decision—action cycle, and so were able to drive the 
discussion. In Iraq and Afghanistan similar agility is necessary: 
“‘Anything that happens with the coalition we put that out because the bad guys have a 
habit of putting their news out quickly, so we have to be pretty quick on the draw too,” 
said Hampton. “We aim to have things on air within an hour.’”[29] 
Daniel in the Lion’s Den 
The United States has had some great success with one of its few Arabic speaking diplomats, 
Alberto Fernandez. While his choice of vocabulary—he is not a native speaker—was unpopular in 
the White House,[30] informal feedback in the Middle East was that the effort had been 
immensely popular, both for what he said, and the fact that he had said it in Arabic. A pool of 
responsive Arabic-etc. speaking officials, retired officials—such as AMB Khalilzadeh or GEN 
Abizaid—and mainstream scholars of Islam able to appear on al-Jazeera et al to engage its 
audience, debate and challenge issues, particularly Islamist ones, just as Senators Clinton, 
McCain and Obama do for domestic issues, would demonstrate the democratic values which the 
West champions. 
A less famous example is that of Ed Husain, a British Islamist who drew back from the brink. He 
was invited to Qatar to take part in a televised debate on tackling Islamist Extremism, where 
“without any censorship, [he] was allowed to say whatever [he] wanted. The audience listened in 
silence.” The results were impressive: 
“The 400-strong audience, with Muslims from as far afield as America and India, turned 
to their electronic devices to carry or lose the motion: ‘This house believes Muslims are 
failing to combat extremism.’ We waited. No people wants to admit to collective failure. 
And yet the audience carried the motion with a massive 70.4 per cent in favor: Muslims 
are failing to combat extremism.”[31] 
Given the demographics of the region, in which more than half the population is under 30, tends 
to be more technically orientated, and aspires to a higher standard of living, including political 
participation, this is IO “Vital Ground” and must be engaged. Direct exposure to such an audience 
is of incalculable benefit, for the studio discussion is often followed by phone-in periods, offering 
the chance for active debate with the target audience. 
Conclusion  
“And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free” 
Information Operations, Strategic Communications, Media Operations etc tend to be seen as a 
tactical tool, useful in changing behavior during a campaign. However, they also have a major 
role to play as part of the wider geo-political discussion—conditioning the way peoples think, and 
thus the way they will act. Although less quantifiable, and harder to co-ordinate, they must be an 
integral part of any grand strategy, to “break the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” An early 
example was the American Universities of Cairo and Beirut, which sought only to educate—in 
contrast with the imperial British and French—and as such public opinion of the United States in 
the Middle East was actively high for minimal cost in blood or treasure. 
While efforts to depict a positive image throughout the wider Middle East are emasculated by the 
West’s political choices, a campaign directing the cold light of truth on ‘Religionist’ activities, 
whether failings of the flesh or of doctrine, will improve the chances that young people in the 
Middle East will reject the distorted and simplistic alternatives offered to them. Were the West to 
get its collective house in order, and conduct foreign policy in accordance with its expressed 
beliefs—removing many of the subject audience’s grievances—it would be attractive to many of 
these people. Instead, the effort must be to engender among active supporters disenchantment 
with the Activists in order to move the active supporters into sullen passivity, thus breaking the 
will to fight in the hearts and minds of the civilian population.  
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